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OF LABOR PROVISIONS IN FOREIGN
TRADE AGREEMENTS
Angel Torres*
ABOR rights, such as the freedom of association, the right to or-
ganize, and the right to bargain collectively, are not ingrained in
the fiber of societies and government systems universally. Unlike
first world countries, developing nations continuously struggle to enforce
labor right provisions attached as conditions in trade agreements., The
inability of governments to redress gruesome acts of violence against
union workers,2 as well as deliberate cases of forced labor and child
Angel Torres received his B.A. from the University of Texas at Arlington in 2010.
He is currently a J.D. Candidate, May 2015 at SMU Dedman School of Law. The
author would like thank his wife and son for their unconditional love and continu-
ing support.
1. See, e.g., infra notes 2-3.
2. In Guatemala, after leaders of the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Empresa Por-
tuaria (the City of Quetzal Dockers' Union) (STEPQ) were fired for participating
in assemblies in opposition to the privatization plans of the Empresa Portuaria
Quetzal (EPQ), the General Secretary of the union was shot over twenty times in
front of his children for allegedly leading the opposition to the privatization plans.
Additionally, two leaders of the Union of Izabal Banana Workers (SITRABI),
including the Secretary of Culture and Sports, were assassinated for their contin-
ued efforts, through marches and rallies, to enforce terms of a collective bargaining
agreement. Moreover, the founder of the Sindicato de Trabajadores del Sur (SIN-
TRABANSUR), another banana union, was assassinated outside his home after
he refused to resign to his position in the union. Also, Sandra Isabel Ramirez, the
daughter of the General Secretary of SINTRABANSUR was kidnapped and gang-
raped by four men who interrogated her about her father's role in the union. AM.
FED'N OF LABOR AND CONG. OF INDUS. ORG.'S (AFL-CIO) ET AL., CONCERNING
Tt'HE FAILURE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA TO EFFECIVELY ENFORCE
rls LABOR LAWS AN1) COMPILY WITH ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER THE ILO DECI-A-
RATION ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS AT WORK (2008), available at
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/GuatemalaSub.pdf [hereinafter SUBMISSION
FROM AFL-CIO]; In Mexico, over ninety organizations, and labor unions jointly
complained after 44,000 employees and members of the Sindicato Mexicano de
Electricistas (Mexican Union of Electrical Workers) (SME) were ejected by the
military police from their workplace after the government ordered the police to
seize the company's facility. This "mass termination" of workers was "undertaken
to eliminate SME's collective agreement and bargaining rights." PUBLIC COMMU-
NICATION TO THE U.S. OFFICE OF TRADE AGREEMENT IMPLEMIENFAION
(OTLA), (2011), available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/MexicoSubmis-
sion2011.pdf [hereinafter Public Submission from SME].
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workers, 3 underscores the ghastly and grave state of labor rights in devel-
oping countries. The United States, for economic purposes and to im-
prove labor rights in developing countries, has used labor rights
provisions as a condition to international agreements. Although this de-
velopment might be considered as a victory in the improvement of labor
rights internationally, the advancement of these rights remains simply as
a wishful thought. Statistics show that despite the pervasiveness of these
provisions in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), the enforcement mecha-
nisms of these provisions go largely unused; to this date, "no complaint
has given rise to a decision of a dispute settlement body or even led to
sanctions. ' '4 The reasons behind this disappointing outcome are mul-
tifaceted, but can be partly attributed to: (1) the complexity of enforce-
ability provisions in an international setting; (2) poor enforceability
systems; and (3) avoidance of the countries themselves to comply with
these provisions. This article will discuss the history and development of
labor rights provisions in international trade agreements, specifically
those to which the United States is a party. Subsequently, it will analyze
the structure of some of these FI'As and how labor provisions are in-
cluded in the text of the agreements, followed by an analysis of the type
of labor provisions and standards in the agreements. To conclude, this
paper will discuss violations, deliberate avoidance, and the lack of en-
forceability that render the labor provisions ineffective by using as illus-
tration the current complaints under review of the Office of Trade and
Labor Affairs (OTLA).
I. TRADE LIBERALIZATION: THE RISE OF FTAS AND THE
PROMOTION OF LABOR RIGHTS
The International Labor Organization (ILO) recently announced that
there has been a substantial increase in the addition of labor provisions
and labor standards in FTAs.5 There are over 120 countries that are par-
ties to fifty-eight FTAs containing labor provisions. 6 The United States
alone is a party to FTAs with nineteen countries.7 In the majority of
these agreements, the parties are bound to follow the principles outlined
in the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work and its Follow-Up. 8 These include the advancement of the "free-
3. See infra pp. 141-144.
4. ILO Report Surveys Proliferation of Labor Provisions in Trade Pacts, 30 BiOOM-
BERG BNA INT'L TRArE REP. 1755 (2013).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. North American Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada; bilateral
agreements with Jordan, Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, Oman;
CAFFA-DR, a regional agreement with the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua; FTAs with Peru, Colombia, Pan-
ama, and South Korea. MARY JANE BOLLE, OVERVIEW OF LABOR ENFORCEMENT
ISSUES IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 2 (2013), available at http://fas.org/sgplcrs/
misc/RS22823.pdf; see also infra note 32.
8. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up,
Geneva, 68th Sess. (June 18, 1998), available at http://www.ilo.org/declaration/
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dom of association and effective recognition of the right to collective bar-
gaining; the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; the
effective abolition of child labour; and the elimination of discrimination
in respect of employment and occupation." 9 Although the adherence to
these standards might not be a serious issue for developed countries like
the United States, it can be a challenge for those developing countries
that lack minimum labor protection laws. Therefore, the increased addi-
tion of labor provisions in FTAs means that more and more developing
countries are faced with the requirement to meet these minimum labor
standards. 10 There are at least sixteen FFAs that contain minimum labor
standards to which developing countries are parties.1 However, the
prominence of labor provisions in FTAs has not always been so perva-
sive. 12 The following is a discussion of how the surge of FTAs and global-
ization in the last decades has affected labor and employment globally.
A. THE EFFECT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION ON
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
The surge of bilateral agreements and FTAs in the last twenty years has
focused the attention to labor organizations, such as the ILO, to assess
the effects of the liberalization of trade on labor and employment.' 3 Ac-
cording to the ILO, currently the "most commonly cited reasons for un-
employment in both developed and developing countries is increased
trade and offshoring. '' 14 The results of several reports on the effect of
liberalization of trade on employment show mixed results, including the
increase of unemployment in certain sections of the economy, such as
manufacturing.1 5 Although trade liberalization has been found to have a
positive effect on wages and the increase of the informal economy, 16 the
majority of empirical data indicates "negative effects on unionization and
bargaining power of employees. '1 7 As a result of this harmful effect on
unions and unionization, trade liberalization is a "highly significant con-
tributor to union militancy." 18 This is the result of the "ongoing genera-
tion of surplus labour in the global economy and increased labour
thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang-en/index.htm [hereinafter ILO 1998
Declaration].
9. Id.
10. ILO Report Surveys Proliferation of Labor Provisions in Trade Pacts, supra note 4.
11. Id.
12. Originally the U.S. trade policy was mostly "focused on lowering tariffs on goods,"
rather than the promotion of labor rights. BOLLE, supra note 7, at 1.
13. See ILO, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 11 (2013), available
at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--dgreports/---inst/documents/publi
cation/wcms_228965.pdf.
14. INr'L LABOUR OFFICE, TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT FROM MYrilS To FACTS 24
(2011), available at http://ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-ed-emp/documents/pub
lication/wcms 162297.pdf.
15. ILO, supra note 13, at 13.
16. Id. at 13-15.
17. Id. at 15.
18. Id. at 15-16.
2014]
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substitution" resulting in the "erosion of union rights."' 19 Additionally,
"there has been a growing concern that globalization and the work of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) have led to sacrificing of human
rights."'20 This negative effect of trade liberalization and the surge of
FTAs along with the concerns of globalization and the erosion of human
and labor rights is justified in the sense that "labor principles and stan-
dards are not subject to the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and
disciplines. ' 21 This means that there is no enforcement mechanism to re-
solve labor concerns arising from trade agreements under the WTO. Fur-
thermore, the WTO has punted the responsibility of dealing with labor
related issues to the ILO, naming the ILO as the "competent body to set
and deal with [labor] standards. '22 The reasoning behind the WTO's
avoidance to promote labor provisions in its agreements is that its "devel-
oping-country members resist including labour standards in WTO rules
because: (a) they see it as a guise for protectionism in developed-country
markets . . . and (b) they argue that better working conditions and im-
proved labour rights arise through economic growth ..... "23 In the midst
of this lack of accountability and substantive forum to address labor
rights, the United States has stepped up as the leading actor in the inter-
national labor rights' arena. Before the WTO and the surge of FTAs in
international trade agreements, there was a gradual development in U.S.
trade policy that resulted in the prominence of labor provisions in inter-
national trade agreements.
B. WHERE DID IT ALL BEGIN? TRADE LIBERALIZATION
IN TRADE LAW
The evolution of the United States' trade policy favoring labor provi-
sions in trade agreements can be traced back to the late 1800s. 24 Succes-
sively, through a series of legislative acts in the 1900s, the United States
started a trend to linking international trade with fair labor standards. 2 5
19. INT'L LABOUR OFICE, supra note 14, at 188.
20. VALANTINA AMALRAJ, LINKING LABOR STANDARDS 'O TRADE INSTRUMENTS:
CONCERNS, METHODS, AND BENEFIS 3 (2012), available at http://www.chumireth
icsfoundation.ca/files/pdf/Ch umirHuman RightsEssayAmalraj2012.pdf.
21. BOLLE, supra note 7, at 1.
22. Trade and Labour Standards Subject of Intense Debate, WTO, http://www.wto.org/
english/thewtoe/ministe/min99_e/english/aboute/l181ab-e.htm (last visited Oct.
27, 2014).
23. Top 10 Reasons to Oppose the World Trade Organization? Criticism, yes... misin-
formation, no!, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min99_e/eng
lish/misinfe/031ab e.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2014).
24. See infra note 25.
25. The McKinley Act of 1890 "prohibited the import of goods made by convict la-
bor," and legislative acts such as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which ex-
panded the McKinley Act to encompass convicts, forced and indentured labor; the
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, which prohibited certain trades that
negatively affected labor rights; the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988 expanded the definition of "unreasonable" actions for trade purposes. Wil-
liam (Bud) Clatanoff, Labor Standards in Recent U.S. Trade Agreements, 5 RICH.
J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 109, 109 (2005).
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This tendency was also reflected in the promotion of labor standards by
governmental institutions such as the Overseas Private Investment Cor-
poration (OPIC), which considers whether an investor company will up-
hold workers' rights as a preliminary assessment of eligibility,2 6 and the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA),27 which requires
the exclusion of certain labor violations such as forced and child labor as
a prerequisite to eligibility of risk insurance guarantees. 28
Despite the robust promotion of labor standards by institutions and
also reflected in legislative trade laws, the real materialization of this de-
velopment has been strikingly displayed in the last twenty-five years. 29
With the enactment of the Trade Act of 1974,30 the United States unilat-
erally and forcefully pushed for the inclusion of labor standards in all
trade agreements and trade laws.3 1 The Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the
President to "designate countries as beneficiary developing countries" for
the purposes of the Trade Act.32 It also lists, as one of the bases of ineli-
gibility, whether the country fails to take "steps to afford internationally
recognized worker rights to workers in the country. ' 33 The decades after
the enactment of the Trade Act were marked by an outburst of "trade
preference laws" that required "as a condition of obtaining and maintain-
ing program eligibility" to abide by the requirements of the Trade Act of
1974.34 This is exemplified in the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI)35 en-
acted in 1983 and its companion, the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP). 36 Both allowed developing countries to trade goods with the
United States, but eligibility to trade was based on whether these coun-
tries took steps to promote certain labor standards. 37 Some other exam-
ples of these "trade preference laws" were the Andean Trade Preference
Act (ATPA) 1991;38 the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)
2000;39 the Trade Act of 2002;40 and the Haiti Opportunity through Part-
nership Act (HOPE), 2006.41 It was in this background that the United
States began including labor provisions in FTAs.
26. Investor Screener, OPIC, http://www.opic.gov/what-we-offer/financial-products/fi
nancing-details/investor-screener (last visited Oct. 27, 2014).
27. Performance Standards, MIGA, http://www.miga.org/projects/index.cfm?stid=1828
(last visited Oct. 27, 2014).
28. Id.; see also Robert Rogowsky & Eric Chyn, U.S. Trade Law and FTAs: A Survey
of Labor Requirements, USITC J. oF INT'L COM. AND ECON. (2007) at 7.
29. See Clatanoff, supra note 25, at 110.
30. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. A. § 2101 (2014).
31. See Clatanoff, supra note 25, at 110; see also Rogowsky, supra note 28, at 3.
32. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2462(a)(1) (2014).
33. Id. § 2462(c)(7).
34. BOLLE, supra note 7, at 1.
35. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2701 (2014).
36. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2461 (2014).
37. BoLLE, supra note 7, at 1.
38. Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), 19 U.S.C.A. § 3202 (2014).
39. African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), 19 U.S.C.A. § 3701 (2014).
40. Trade Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C.A. § 3803 (2014).
41. Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity Through Partnership Encouragement Act of
2006 (Haitian HOPE Act), Pub. L. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2922 (2006); Bosi , supra
note 7, at 1.
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II. LABOR PROVISIONS IN TRADE AGREEMENTS
Currently, the United States is a party to fourteen FTAs with twenty
countries 42 and in present negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
which will include Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan,
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. 43 Based
on the current trend, it is very likely that the Trans-Pacific Partnership
FTA will have labor provisions attached to it, 4 4 but this was not always
the case. The first FTA the United States entered was with Israel in 1985,
followed by Canada in 1988. 4 5 These two agreements did not contain
labor provisions. 46 But starting in 1993, the United States began to in-
clude labor standards in all trade agreements and it has continued this
practice since then.47 Behind this shift is the fact that the United States
began negotiating FTAs with developing countries. 48 It became generally
accepted that labor issues had an impact on trade and that globalization
had positive and negative effects. 49 There are different theories that at-
tempt to explain the incredibly rapid rise of labor provisions in FTAs.50
Whatever the theory, whether political, economic, or moral, the trend
continues strong after twenty-five years.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 51 was the "first
U.S. international trade agreement actively to include labor provi-
sions. ' 52 The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC), which is a side agreement of NAFTA, "required each party
[Mexico, Canada, and the United States] to maintain high levels of labor
protection without lowering standards to attract investors.' '53 The
NAALC includes eleven labor rights that must be observed by the par-
ties. 54 As this paper will discuss, variations of these provisions are in-
42. Free Trade Agreements, INT'L TRADE ADMIN., http://trade.gov/fta/ (last visited
Nov. 4, 2014).
43. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), UNITED STrATEs TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://
www.ustr.gov/tpp (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
44. See infra p. 111, note 56.





50. It is argued that the inclusion of labor standards in FTAs reflects the acceptance
that the adoption of said provisions is linked to economic development and reduc-
tion of production costs. This implies that the adoption of these standards en-
hances the labor market in developing countries which in turn increases
productivity. Additionally, it has been argued that consumers in developed coun-
tries have a moral compass which results in the refusal to buy products from coun-
tries that fail to meet decent labor standards. But this moral theory is subject to a
great deal of criticism. See JACQUE BOURGEOIS ET AL., A COMPARATIVE ANALY-
SIS O SELECrFED PROVISIONS IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 22-23 (2007), availa-
ble at http://eulib.com/documents/tradoc_138103.pdf.
51. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993).
52. Rogowsky & Chyn, supra note 28, at 6.
53. Id.
54. Infra note 93.
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cluded in most FTAs to which the United States is a party. Some of the
FFAs vary in the scope of these provisions, but all remain very similar.
The following is a discussion about the different labor provisions in the
several FTAs to which the United States is a party.
A. SCOPE AND THE DIFFERENT FTA MODELS
The preamble in any FTA will indicate the general purpose of the
agreement itself.5 5 FTAs which include a direct reference to upholding
labor standards in the preamble will usually have a stronger emphasis on
these standards, as the preamble is "designed to establish a definitive re-
cord of the intention or purpose of the parties in entering the agree-
ment."'56 Therefore, the preamble "may be used as a source of
interpretative guidance by government officials and judges in the process
of implementation and dispute settlement. ' '57 Every FTA to which the
United States is a party contains references to labor standards, 58 except
the U.S.-Israel5 9 and U.S.-Canada agreements, which was superseded by
NAFTA in 1994.60 For example, the U.S.-Singapore FTA contains a very
general and weak reference to labor standards, and lumps it together with
environmental and social issues.61 In contrast, the FTAs with Jordan62
and Chile63 have the most direct and strong commitments to international
labor law and standards. 64 The U.S.-Jordan FTA's preamble indicates the
desire of the parties to "promote higher labor standards by building on
their respective international commitments and strengthening their coop-
eration on labor matters. '65 The U.S.-Chile FTA contains resolutions in
the preamble to "create new employment opportunities and improve
working conditions and living standards" and to "build on their respec-
55. BOURGwOIS FT AL., supra note 50, at 13.
56. Id. at 13, 24.
57. Id. at 13.
58. Id. at 24.
59. Free Trade Area Agreement, U.S.-Isr., Apr. 22, 1985, 24 I.L.M 653 (1985), availa-
ble at http://tcc.export.govfFrade-Agreements/AllTradeAgreements/expO05439
.asp.
60. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can., Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M.
281 (1988), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/cusfta-e.pdf [hereinafter Canada FTA].
61. "Recognizing that economic development, social development, and environmental
protection are interdependent and mutually reinforcing components of sustainable
development, and that an open and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system
can play a major role in achieving sustainable development." United States-Singa-
pore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., pmbl., May 6, 2003, Hein's KAV No. 6376,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/singa-
pore/asset-upload-file708_4036.pdf [hereinafter Singapore FTA]; BOUGEOIS ET
AL., supra note 50, at 24.
62. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, pmbl., Oct. 24,
2000, 41 I.L.M. 63 (2000) [hereinafter Jordan FTA].
63. United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, pmbl., June 6, 2003, http://
www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta/final-text, (2003)
[hereinafter Chile FTA].
64. BOURGEOIS EF AL., supra note 50, at 25.
65. Jordan FTA, supra note 62.
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tive international commitments and strengthen their cooperation on la-
bor matter."'6 6
The general structure of the FFA can also reflect on the scope and
impact of the labor provisions. The FTA approach for each country will
vary according to the terms of the agreement. But all of these agree-
ments can be categorized in four different categories. 67
1. Model I
An example of a Model 1 FTA is the NAALC.68 These labor provi-
sions are included not in the main agreement (NAFFA), but in a separate
arrangement. 69 Although violations for noncompliance of the labor pro-
visions in the NAALC could be enforced under the NAFTA enforcement
procedures, the NAALC contains its own separate enforcement
mechanism.70
2. Model 2
The Model 2 FFAs contain both commercial and labor provisions,
which are enforced under the same dispute resolution mechanism. 71 The
labor provisions in these FTAs are defined "as U.S. internationally recog-
nized worker rights."' 72 An example of this Model is the U.S.-Jordan
FTA.7 3
3. Model 3
These agreements include only one enforceable labor resolution, which
states that the parties "shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor
laws ... in a manner affecting trade between the Parties. '74 The defini-
tion of labor rights is also "internationally recognized worker rights. '75
The FTAs with Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, Oman,
and the CAFTA-DR regional agreement, which includes Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Repub-
lic, are examples of this Model. 76
4. Model 4
These agreements are based on the Bipartisan Trade Deal, which is a
"policy template" used in the drafting of FrAs with Peru, Columbia, Pan-
66. Chile FTA, supra note 63.
67. BOLLE, supra note 7, at 3.
68. See, BoirLE, supra note 7, at 3; North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC), pmbl., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M 1519 (1993), available at http://www
.naalc.org/naalc/naalc-full-text/preamble.htm [hereinafter NAALC].









ama, and Korea.77 The Bipartisan Trade Deal requires the inclusion of
reciprocal obligations for these countries to "adopt and maintain in their
laws and practice the five basic internationally-recognized labor princi-
ples."'78 These principles are: (1) adoption of freedom of association; (2)
the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (3) the elim-
ination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; (4) the effective aboli-
tion of child labor and a prohibition on the worst forms of child labor;
and (5) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation. 79 These principles are based on the 1998 ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles at Work, 80 with the only difference that the Bi-
partisan Deal principles separate the freedom of association and the ef-
fective recognition of right to collective bargaining as two different
principles. 8 1
The structure of the FTAs themselves, including the statement in the
preamble as a vision of the purpose of the agreement, might affect the
enforceability and scope of the agreements. But the actual labor provi-
sions in the agreements are the main attraction.
B. WHAT ARE THESE LABOR PROVISIONS?
The ILO is the prominent and active branch of the United Nations
(UN), responsible for the promotion and enforcement of labor rights
around the world. It was established in 1919 as part of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles at the end of the First World War.82 The ILO attempts to meet its
goals by encouraging "its constituents and member States by promoting a
social dialogue between trade unions and employers in formulating, and
where appropriate, implementing national policy" aimed at improving
workers' rights.83 Since its creation, the ILO has promulgated fundamen-
tal principles and rights of workers. The most recognized of these
promulgations is the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work. 84 The ILO refers to these principles and rights as "obli-
gation[s] arising from the very fact of membership in the [ILO]," but also
obligations to those countries that have not ratified the ILO Conven-
tions.85 When it comes to implementation of these labor principles, the
ILO "provides for supervision of implementation of its Conventions and
sets out a complaints procedures," but "neither the Declaration, nor any
77. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, BIPARTISAN TRADE DEAL 1
(2007), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2007/
asset-upload-file127_11319.pdf [hereinafter Bipartisan Trade Deal].
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. ILO 1998 Declaration, supra note 8.
81. See BIPARTISAN TRADE DEAl, supra note 77, at 1-2.
82. Origins and History, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/history/lang-en/
index.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2014).
83. How the ILO Works, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-
works/lang-en/index.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2014).
84. ILO 1998 Declaration, supra note 8.
85. Id.
2014]
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of the Conventions contain an enforcement mechanism. '8 6 Therefore,
the ILO does not provide for a remedy under the WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding,8 7 and the only recourse would be a challenge
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) "for failure to uphold its
treaty obligations. '88 As a result, the United States and, to some degree,
the European Union (EU) have included their own labor standards in the
FTFAs (some that go beyond the ILO's principles)89 and enforcement
mechanisms to enforce these provisions. The United States has led the
developed world in the inclusion of these provisions in trade agreements.
These labor standards have been included in some very well-known and
influential FTAs, such as NAFTA. The following is an analysis and com-
parison of some of the more relevant FTAs based on the different types
of labor provisions included in them.
1. NAFTA or NAALC?
The NAALC is the side agreement of NAFITA that includes the labor
provisions. The NAALC was the first trade agreement "ever linked to
worker rights provisions in a major way." 90 Additionally, it was the first
agreement where the United States included specific labor provisions
with "potential economic sanctions for labor rights violations following
an arbitration process." 91 Because it was the first agreement of this kind,
it has been used as a model since then. Therefore, a careful analysis of its
structure and breadth is warranted.
The structure of the NAALC is unlike most other FTAs. This differ-
ence is because, as discussed before, 92 the NAALC includes all of the
labor provisions detached from the commercial provisions. For this rea-
son, the NAALC is technically an agreement exclusively for the promo-
tion and protection of labor rights. It calls for the parties to comply with
the NAFTA commercial resolutions from the perspective of workers'
rights.93 Additionally, it recognizes labor rights and principles that are
86. Roman Grynberg & Veniana Qalo, Labour Standards in US and EU Preferential
Trading Arrangements, 40 J. WORLD TRADIE 619, 622 (2006).
87. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, available at http.'//www.wto.org/englishtratop_
e/dispue/dsue.htm [hereinafter DSU].
88. Grynberg & Qalo, supra note 86, at 622.
89. See supra p. 114.
90. MARY JANE BoL-LE, NAFTA LABOR SIDE-. AGREEMENT: LESSONS FOR TH-E
WORKER RIGHTS AN) FAsT-TRACK DEBATE, intro. (2001), available at http://fpc
.state.gov/documents/organization/6211.pdf [hereinafter NAFTA LABOR SIDE
AGREEMENT].
91. Grynberg & Qalo, supra note 86, at 626.
92. See supra pp. 111-114.
93. The parties agree to promote the economic development envisioned in NAFTA by
"investing in continuous human resource development, including for entry into the
workforce and during periods of unemployment; promoting employment security
and career opportunities for all workers through referral and other employment
services; strengthening labor-management cooperation to promote greater dia-
logue between worker organizations and employers and to foster creativity and
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not part of the ILO's 1998 Declaration. Under the agreement, Mexico,
Canada, and the United States are committed to promote the following
"guiding principles":
1. The freedom of association and protection of right to organize;
2. The right to bargain collectively;
3. The right to strike;
4. The prohibition of forced labor;
5. Labor protections for children and young people;
6. Minimum employment standards, including minimum wage;
7. The elimination of employment discrimination;
8. Equal pay for women and men;
9. The prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses;
10. Compensation for occupational injuries and illnesses; and
11. Protection of migrant workers.
94
Out of these eleven provisions, the minimum wage requirement and
prevention of occupational injuries are a significant departure from the
standard ILO principles.95 Nevertheless, these eleven principles are
"guiding principles" that the parties are "committed to promote," not
necessarily enforce. 96 But the parties are (without infringing on each
other's constitutions) obligated to adhere to their own domestic labor
laws and "adopt or modify" to ensure that their laws "provide for high
labor standards. ' 97 Therefore, the NAALC is both a very expansive but
constricted agreement when it comes to the promotion versus the en-
forcement of labor provisions. On one hand, it dramatically expands
what was considered fundamental labor rights under the ILO, but it does
not require the parties to adopt them, rather to simply continue to ob-
serve their own labor laws. Also, the NAALC does not provide a defini-
tion of "high labor standards," and it is left to the interpreter to discern
this meaning from the preamble and annex 1, which contain the eleven
principles the agreement seeks to promote.98
Although the NAALC adoption is revolutionary because it dramati-
cally changed the landscape of FTAs in terms of labor rights, it has been
subject to criticism from all fronts.99 The criticism might be warranted.
The NAALC falls short in achieving what was originally an expansive
plan, and there is no real threat behind obligations. This is because under
productivity in the workplace; promoting higher living standards as productivity
increases; encouraging consultation and dialogue between labor, business and gov-
ernment both in each country and in North America; fostering investment with
due regard for the importance of labor laws and principles; encouraging employers
and employees in each country to comply with labor laws and to work together in
maintaining a progressive, fair, safe and healthy working environment." North
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), pmbl., Sept. 14, 1993, 32
I.L.M 1519 (1993).
94. Id. at annex 1.
95. ILO 1998 Declaration, supra note 8.
96. NAALC, supra note 93, at annex 1.
97. Id. at pt. 2.
98. See Grynberg & Qalo, supra note 86, at 627; see also BOLLE, supra note 90, at 4.
99. BOLLE, supra note 90, at 8-9.
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NAFTA, the "maximum disciplinary action is suspension of a portion of
NAFTA benefits for one year" if there is a violation of the agreement. 00
But this provision does not apply because the NAALC is a side agree-
ment of NAFITA. 10 1 On the other hand, there are those who argue that it
is an invasive agreement that "impinges on the freedom of multinational
corporations to bring goods to the consumer at the lowest possible
cost.' 02 Nevertheless, the NAALC is innovative, and it "promotes
worker rights by creating a system of mutual obligation and mutual re-
sponsibility" while allowing the parties to maintain their sovereignty and
to adopt their "own labor laws and standards and enforce them as [they]
see fit.' 103
2. Next? The U.S.-Jordan FTA
The U.S.-Jordan FTA is significant because, unlike NAFTA and its
companion, the NAALC, it included the labor provisions in the main text
of the agreement.10 4 Furthermore, it was the first FTA that the United
States entered into with an Arab state'0 5 and the first time labor provi-
sions were added to the main text of a U.S. bilateral trade accord.' 0 6 It
also contains a reference to the promotion of "higher labor standards"
and enforcement of "labor law" by the parties in the preamble of the
agreement.10 7 Additionally, the labor section of the agreement is en-
closed in article 6 of the FTA.'0 8 Unlike NAFTA, the U.S.-Jordan FTA
defines "labor laws" as those principles in the 1998 ILO Declaration. 0 9
Also, it not only requires the promotion of these standards, but also re-
quires the parties to improve or enact labor laws in order to meet those
standards." 0 Therefore, although this agreement does not include all
eleven principles from the NAALC, it obligates the parties to take affirm-
ative action to adhere to the terms.
3. FTAs in the South... Way South: U.S.-Chile FTA
The original design of this agreement was intended to mirror the
NAALC, meaning that the FTA would be divided into two parts-one
commercial and one labor-related. 1" In the end, the agreement followed
100. Id. at 8.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 9.
104. See Grynberg & Qalo, supra note 86, at 624.
105. Abdul Quader Shaikh, Bilateral Accords and U.S. Trade with the Middle East: A
Track Record for Success, INT'L TRADE ADMIN. (Apr. 2008), http://trade.gov/
press/publications/newsletters/ita_0408/middle-east 0408.asp.
106. MOHAMED RAMADAN HASSANIEN, UNITED STATES BILiATERAi FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS: CONSISTENCIES OR CONFLICTS WilH NORMS IN THE MIDD-LE EAST?
192 (2010).
107. Jordan FTA, supra note 62, at pmbl.
108. Id. art. 6.
109. See id. at pmbl.
110. Id.
111. See Grynberg & Qalo, supra note 86, at 633.
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the U.S.-Jordan example.' 1 2 Consequently, unlike the NAALC, this FTA
has an exclusive article for its labor related matters.1 13 It also contains
two resolutions in the preamble where the parties agree to "[b]uild on
their respective international commitments and strengthen their coopera-
tion on labor matters" and "[p]rotect, enhance, and enforce basic
worker's rights." 114 Article 18 of the agreement is a "robust labor chap-
ter ... [that] set the template for all future U.S. free trade agreements
.... 1 But the labor provisions are limited to those from the 1998 ILO
Declaration. Additionally, it defines labor laws to include "acceptable
conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and
occupational safety and health. 11 6 It also mandates the parties to ensure
that the parties do not "waive," "derogate," "weaken[ ], or reduce[ ] ad-
herence to the internationally recognized labor rights" from the ILO
Declaration. 117 Another important aspect of the agreement is that it in-
cludes a provision requiring the countries to guarantee access to the judi-
cial system for the enforcement of their labor laws. 118 This article seems
to indicate that the parties should create a system to allow aggrieved par-
ties to bring their claims for violations of the agreement.
4. More Acronyms, the DR-CAFTA
The Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement
(DR-CAFTA) includes the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.'1 9 The DR-CAFTA (also referred as
the CAFTA-DR depending on what side of the Equator you live) is very
much like the U.S.-Chile FTA in the sense that it contains its labor provi-
sions within the main text of the agreement and adopts the same 1998
ILO labor principles, plus minimum wage, hours, and occupational safety
provisions.' 2 0 Prior to the enactment of the agreement, the regional
countries "asked the ILO to do an assessment of their conformity with
the obligations reflected in the 1998 Declaration.' 12 1 In 2003 and 2004,
the ILO certified that the constitutions and labor laws of these countries
followed with the 1998 ILO Declaration.122 Also, the DR-CAFTA thrice
112. Id.
113. Chile FTA, supra note 63, at ch. 18.
114. Chile FTA, supra note 63, at pmbl.
115. ANDREW SAMET, LABOR PROVISIONS IN U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS CASE
STUDY OF Mi xico, Cini-E, COSTA RICA, EL SALVADOR 40 (2011), available at
http://www.iadb.org/en/publications/publication-detail,7101 .html?id=57986.
116. Chile FTA, supra note 63, art. 18.8(e).
117. Id. art. 18.2(2).
118. Id. art. 18.3(1).
119. SAMIgI, supra note 115, at 50.
120. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-
Dom. Rep.-Cent. Am., ch.16, Aug. 5, 2004, 119 Stat. 462, available at http:l/www
.ustr.gov/sitesldefault/files/uploads/agreements/cafta/asset upload file320_3936
.pdf [hereinafter DR-CAFTA].
121. SAMEIr, supra note 115, at 51.
122. Id.
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references labor provisions and social development in the preamble. 123
As discussed, the preamble could be an indicator of how important the
labor provisions are to the parties-as it can be used as an interpretative
guide when resolving disputes.1 24 It should be noted that the United
States was particularly weary of entering into this agreement due to sev-
eral concerns over labor conditions in the region.' 25 This concern is
somewhat apparent from the strong language in the preamble regarding
labor standards. A peculiar aspect of this agreement is that the agree-
ment almost did not pass due to these concerns. 126 The International La-
bor Rights Forum (ILRF) offered testimony in front of the U.S. House of
Representatives where it argued that "[t]he DR-CAFTA was premised in
part on the belief that participating Central American countries had
made progress in advancing worker rights" but that the ILRF "found the
opposite to be true: rampant workers' rights abuses, such as union op-
pression; mandatory pregnancy testing; use of child labor; and forced
overtime continue."' 27 According to the ILRF, the agreement would
"lead to further the exploitation of workers" and "leaves conditions ripe
for corporate growth and control.' 28 As a response to the criticism and
concerns, the Working Group of the Vice Ministers Responsible for
Trade and Labor in the CAFTA region submitted The Labor Dimension
in Central America and the Dominican Republic, Building on Progress:
Strengthening Compliance and Enhancing Capacity report, which is re-
ferred to as the White Paper.' 29 The White Paper "includes recommen-
dations designed to make progress on labor law administration and
capacity building and identify ways to improve enforcement and enhance
labor institutions. ' 130 It determined six areas on which the parties could
focus and act to improve labor rights: "labor law and its implementation;
budget and personnel needs in Labor Ministries; strengthening the judi-
cial system for labor law; protection against discrimination in the work-
place; worst forms of child labor; and promoting a culture of
123. The parties agree to "[c]reate new opportunities for economic and social develop-
ment in the region; [p]rotect, enhance, and enforce basic worker's rights and
strengthen their cooperation on labor matters; [and] create new employment op-
portunities and improve working conditions and living standards in their respective
territories .... " See DR-CAFTA, supra note 120, at pmbl.
124. See infra pp. 145-46.
125. Edmund L. Andrews, How Cafta Passed House by 2 Votes, N.Y. TIMEs (July 29,
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/29/politics/29cafta.html?pagewanted=all&
r=0.
126. Id.; see DR-CA FTA and Worker's Rights: Moving from Paper to Practice, WASH.
OFF. ON LATIN AM. (June 11, 2009), http://www.wola.org/publications/dr_cafta_
and workers-rights moving-from-papertopractice.
127. DR-CAFTA, INT'i LAB. Rrs. F., http://archive-org.com/page/3182380/2013-11-18/
http://www.laborrights.org/creating-a-sweatfree-world/changing-global-trade-rules/
dr-cafta (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).
128. Id.
129. CAFTA-DR: White Paper and Verification Reports, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/labor/bilateral-and-regional-




compliance. ' 131 The White Paper recommendations are actually a two-
step process: (1) it required the countries to present a report on their
current labor laws along with an implementation plan, followed by (2) a
verification report every six months between 2007 and 2010.132 As part
of the deal to pass the agreement, the U.S. Trade Representative and
Congress agreed to provide forty million dollars for trade capacity build-
ing in the signatory countries and three million dollars to the ILO to
monitor the member countries. 133 The White Paper has been criticized as
"a tactic to get DR-CAFTA passed in the U.S. Congress"'134 and "a self-
assessment, written by the CAFTA-DR governments at the signing of the
free trade agreement, on how to improve labor rights in their own coun-
tries.1 35 Nevertheless, the FTA was enacted, and each country submit-
ted their implementation plan and subsequently the verification report.136
Accordingly, each country identified areas where improvement was
needed and suggested action to correct the issues. 137 Some of these find-
ings were:
" Costa Rica
" Clarify legal status of collective bargaining in the public sector ....
" Alter regulations concerning union membership: change law that
prevents foreign nationals from holding office or exercising influ-
ence in trade unions ....
" Strengthen protections for union members ....
* Dominican Republic
" Ensure protections for collective bargaining rights ....
" Guarantee the right to strike ....
" Increase efforts to reform the status of collective bargaining and
the requirements for legal union recognition ....
" El Salvador
" Must ratify ILO Conventions 87 and 98.
" Remove limitations on Article 47 of the Constitution regarding
public sector unions....
" Address concerns about blacklisting ....
" Guatemala
" Reform limits on union membership ....
" Remove conditions on striking .....
" Comply with reinstatement of illegally dismissed workers.
" Restore the authority of the Ministry of Labor ....
" Honduras
" Amend exceptions in applicability of the Labor Code ....
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. WASH. OFF. ON LATIN AM., DR-CAFTA AND WORKER'S RiGirFs: MOVING FROM
PAPIER TO PRAcIcICE 2 (2009), available at http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/
downloadable/Rights%20and%20Development/2010/WOLARPTWorkers
RightsFNL.pdf [hereinafter WOLA].
134. Id. at 10.
135. Id. at 4.
136. A list of the Implementation Plans and Verification Reports can be accessed at
CAFTA-DR: White Paper and Verification Reports, supra note 129.
137. See id.
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" Ease onerous requirements for unionization such as requiring the
minimum of 30 members ....
" Reform limitations on the right to strike ....
* Require consultation with the Economic and Social Council about
any reforms to labor laws.
* Nicaragua
" Restore laws protecting public sector unions' rights ....
" Remove restrictions on the participation of foreign nationals in
trade unions.
" Repeal laws governing membership in trade unions ....
* Recognize the right to strike for federations and confederations
138
As we will discuss, many of these recommendations were not followed
through, and the DR-CAF[A is by far the most contentious FTA of to-
day when it comes to labor conditions and labor rights violations.
1 39
5. United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement
The United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (U.S.-Peru TPA)
is very similar to the DR-CAFTA agreement because it follows the same
labor principles from the 1998 ILO Declaration, but also includes the ob-
ligation "on the elimination of discrimination in respect of employ-
ment. ' 140 This is highly relevant because this was the first time that this
ILO principle was ever included in the main body of an FTA. 141 Before
this FITA, the only other agreement that mentioned this principle was the
NAALC. 142 Additionally, the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement
(TPA) imposes "hard obligation[s]" on the parties to follow these princi-
ples.143 In contrast with previous FTAs, the U.S.-Peru TPA states that
the parties "shall adopt and maintain in its statutes and regulations, and
practices thereunder, the following rights, as stated in the ILO Declara-
tion on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.' 44 Therefore, it
requires the parties to actually amend their labor laws to mirror the ILO
principles.
6. FTAs Between Equals
The United States-Australia FITA (U.S.-Australia FITA) is an interest-
ing treaty because both countries are considered developed countries,
and as a result, they are assumed to have better labor conditions than
138. WOLA, supra note 133 at 4.
139. See infra pp. 144-46.
140. SAME' r, supra note 115, at 73.
141. Id.
142. Following the adoption of this principle, the United States conditionally included it
in following FITAs such as the agreements with Panama, Colombia, and South Ko-
rea. Id. at 73-74.
143. Id. at 74.
144. United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, ch.17, Apr. 12, 2006,
121 Stat. 1455, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agree
ments/peru-tpa/final-text [hereinafter U.S.-Peru TPA].
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those of developing countries. It was also the first FFA "between the
[United States] and another developed country since the U.S.-Canada
FTA in 1988. '145 The U.S.-Australia FTA "only requires that each
[p]arty include in their domestic labour laws recognition and protection
of 'acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages."146
Under the agreement, as in the U.S.-Chile FTA, the parties retain the
power to "exercise their discretion with respect to compliance matters
"147
7. Let's Not Forget About the Rest of the World
Although this article is mostly focused on U.S. trade policy in regards
to labor provisions, it is informative to compare other FTAs between
countries that affirmatively lower the scope of their labor provisions to fit
their economic needs. A perfect example of this is the agreement be-
tween Japan and the Republic of the Philippines for an Economic Part-
nership. 148 Specifically, the parties agree to not weaken or reduce
observance to international labor rights, as opposed to strive to improve
labor laws within each country.149 The agreement among Iceland, Liech-
tenstein, Norway, and Swiss (the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA) States) with Singapore1 50 also reflects the delicate issue of labor
provisions in international trade agreements. The EFTA-Singapore FTA
does not make any reference to labor provisions or labor rights, but calls
for the creation of "conditions encouraging economic, trade[,] and invest-
ment relations" between the countries. 1 51 The EFTA-Singapore FTA is
similar to most EFTA trade agreements in that these FTAs "only contain
references dealing with labour standards in the preamble and in the
objectives. 1 52 For example, the FTA between Colombia and the EFTA
States contains one single reference to labor in the preamble: "Reaffirm-
ing their commitment to economic and social development and the re-
spect for the fundamental rights of workers, including the principles set
out in the International Labor Organization (ILO) Conventions to which
145. Grynberg & Qalo, supra note 86, at 34.
146. Id. at 34-35 (quoting United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl.,
art. 18.7, Jan. 1, 2005, 118 Stat. 919, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/
files/australiaFTALabor.pdf).
147. Id. at 35.
148. Agreement Between the EFTA States and Singapore, EFTA-Sing., pmbl., June 26,
2002, available at http://www.efta.int/media/documents/legal-texts/free-trade-rela
tions/singapore/EFTA-Singapore%20Free%20Trade%20Agreement.pdf.
149. Id. art. 103.
150. Agreement Between the EFTA States and Singapore, EFTA-Sing., pmbl., June 26,
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the Parties are party."'1 53 The contrast between the FTA approach of the
European Union (EU) and that of the United States is dramatic. The EU
"has shown no appetite for such [labor] provisions in its FTA and associa-
tion agreements.' 154 The result is a great disparity in the number of labor
provisions in U.S. FTAs and EU FTAs.' 55
The Middle East is another region worth mentioning because of its
unique approach to FTAs. Despite the predominance of FTAs and estab-
lishment of "trade areas" in the Middle East, there has been no serious
attempt to connect these trade instruments with labor provisions. 15 6 An
illustration of this is the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), which
creates a massive regional trade area in North Africa and the Middle
East.157 GAFTA was enacted on January 1, 1998, and since then has
"reached full trade liberalisation of goods through the full exemption of
customs duties and charges" between its members. 158 Despite the scope
and size of the agreement, GAFTA does not contain any references to
labor standards. 159 In contrast, the 2001 Economic Agreement Between
the GCC States160 contains one single reference to labor standards.16 1 It
calls for the unification of labor laws and elimination of restrictions on
labor.' 62 But this provision remains unenforced and unfulfilled. 63
Despite the explosion in recent years of FTAs with labor provisions,
the United States is the strongest advocate for the conditional inclusion
of labor standards and labor provisions in international trade agree-
ments.1 64 This is demonstrated by the low number of international FTAs
and trade areas that have labor references. Other issues with labor refer-
153. Free Trade Agreement Between the Republic of Colombia and the EFTA States,
pmbl., Nov. 25, 2008, available at http://www.efta.int/free-trade/free-trade-agree
ments/colombia [hereinafter Colombia EFTA].
154. Grynberg & Qalo, supra note 86, at 5.
155. See id.
156. See HASSANIEN, supra note 106, at 193.
157. The seventeen countries that are part of GAFTA are: Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jor-
dan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Greater Arab Free
Trade Area (GAFTA), MINISTRY INDUSTRY & TRADE-HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF
JORDAN, http://mit.gov.jo/EN/The%20Center/ForeignTrade/Pages/Greater-Arab-
Free-Trade-Area-%28GAFTA%29.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2015).
158. Id.
159. HASSANIEN, supra note 106, at 193.
160. The Economic Agreement Between the GCC States, art. 17, Dec. 21, 2001, availa-
ble at sites.gcc-sg.org/DLibrary/download.php?B=168 [hereinafter GCC Agree-
ment]. The Arab States of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a group that
includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab States.
List of GCC countries, DUBAi FAQs, http://www.dubaifaqs.com/list-of-gcc-coun
tries.php (last visited Jan. 12, 2015).
161. GCC Agreement, supra note 160, art. 17.
162. HASSANIEN, supra note 106, at 194.
163. Id.
164. See FRANZ CHRISTIAN E1ERT & ANNE POSThUMA, LABOUR PROVISIONS IN




ences in FAs include the difficulty enforcing these provisions and the
struggle on the part of developing countries to meet these standards.
III. AVOIDANCE, ENFORCEMENT, AND COMPLAINTS:
HOW ARE THESE PROVISIONS ENFORCED?
OR, ARE THEY?
Bringing foreign labor standards into countries that are in the process
of developing their economies might cause friction. Developing countries
are "reluctant to enforce labour laws in general and to support union
rights . . . in particular for fear of losing foreign direct investment. '165
This fear is the consequence of the "race to the bottom" effect, which
causes developing countries to "compete with each other by instituting
laws that unfriendly to workers" to bring in foreign investment and facto-
ries by offering low costs of production. 166 The result is that when labor
standards fall in one country, surrounding countries' standards also
fall. 167 Statistics show that despite the increase of labor laws enacted in
developing countries, which can be attributed to the adoption of ILO
standards and inclusion of labor standards in trade agreements with other
countries, there is a steady decline in the adherence to these standards.1 68
Therefore, although there has been a significant increase in the adoption
of labor provisions in the last twenty-five years,t 69 these standards con-
tinue to decline. The reasons behind this phenomenon are complex and
expand beyond the scope of this paper. Conversely, a careful analysis of
the enforcement provisions, along with current violations and avoidance,
is warranted in order to understand what contributes to this regression.
It is important to consider that there are two types of labor provisions
in IFTAs: provisional and conditional. 170 The conditional provisions "are
linked to economic consequences, in the form of sanctions or, less fre-
quently, incentives, which concern trade or other benefits, including tech-
nical cooperation. 1 17 1 In contrast, the promotional provisions are legally
binding or non-binding commitments between parties to engage in "coop-
erative activities, dialogue, and monitoring.' 72 Moreover, all FTAs (to
which the United States is a party) include internal processes and proce-
dures to resolve disputes, or make recommendations in case one of the
parties is in noncompliance with the labor provisions. 17 3 But these en-
forcement provisions are often no more than discretionary measures that
165. IPrh'j. LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 14, at 189.





169. Between 1990 and 2013 the number of trade agreements containing labor provi-
sions rose from zero to fifty-eight. ILO, supra note 13, at 19, fig.1.3.
170. See id. at 21, box 1.1.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See EBERT & POS-rHtUMA, supra note 164, at 10-11.
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result in nonbinding conclusions or recommendations.17 4
But the U.S. Department of Labor might offer some recourse to af-
fected parties. The Office of Trade and Labor Affairs (OTLA) is an or-
ganization within the U.S. Department of Labor with oversight over the
protection of labor standards in FTAs with labor provisions and labor
chapters. 175 OTLA accepts "'submissions' from interested organizations
that believe a trading partner is not fulfilling the labor commitments it
made."'1 76 With that in mind, the following discussion will highlight some
of the most significant shortcomings of the most relevant FTAs.
A. THE GOOD?: NAALC
1. Enforcement
The NAALC is a complex agreement with different enforcement
mechanisms linked to specific obligations of the parties. The highpoint of
the NAALC is that its "guiding principles" are not enforced equally. 177
For example, the principles of freedom of association and right to bargain
collectively are "enforceable by discussion of the National Administrative
Offices, Secretariat, and Ministerial Council.' 7 8 These entities are cre-
ated by the NAALC, along with the Evaluation Committee and Arbitral
Panel,179 to receive, review, investigate, enforce, and implement policies
and decisions deriving from noncompliance issues.180 The dispute resolu-
tion mechanism to resolve noncompliance issues 18 1 begins with a "sub-
mission" to the National Administrative Office (NAO).182 But if the
issue is not resolved by the NAO, the next step depends on what type of
provision is involved.183 For example, minimum wage, or any other
Group III provision, can be referred to an Evaluation Committee of Ex-
174. See id. at 21.
175. Free Trade Agreement Administration, U.S. DEPARTMENT LAB., http://www.dol
.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
176. Submissions Under the Labor Provisions of Free Trade Agreements, U.S. DEPART-
MENT oiF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/fta-subs.htm (last visited
Jan. 14, 2015) (alteration in original).
177. The guiding principles can be divided into three different groups. Group I in-
cludes the freedom of association and right to organize; the right to bargain collec-
tively; and the right to strike. Group II includes the prohibition of forced labor;
minimum employment standards pertaining to overtime pay; elimination of em-
ployment discrimination; equal pay for women and men; compensation in cases of
occupational injuries and illnesses; and protection of migrant workers. Group III
includes labor protections for children and young persons; minimum employment
standards pertaining to minimum wages; and prevention of occupational injuries.
See BoiE-, supra note 90, at 4, fig.1.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 7. The Evaluation Committee and the Arbitral Panel are ad hoc entities that
are created to address complaints under Group II and Group ItI of the principles.
Id.
180. See id., at 6, fig.3.
181. Under the NAALC, the countries are not obligated to adhere to the guiding prin-
ciples, but to enforce their own labor laws. See supra pp. 118-19.
182. See BOLLE, supra note 90, at 7.
183. See id.
A WISHFUL THOUGHT
perts (ECE), then to an Arbitral Panel (AP). 184 An AP can issue mone-
tary sanctions, which, if no payment is made, could lead to the loss of
NAFTA benefits. 185
2. Complaints
Within six years of the implementation of the NAALC, NAOs received
a total of twenty-three submissions.18 6 Currently, thirty-eight submis-
sions have been filed under this agreement. 87 Most of the complaints
are against Mexico, which is the only developing country party to the
agreement.' 8 8 These complaints are mostly related to violations of child
labor, gender-based discrimination, minimum wage, and occupational
safety. 189 Additionally, Mexico has had some issues complying with the
right of workers to organize and bargain collectively, as adopted in the
NAALC. 190 In Mexico, it is common for employers to use "protections
contracts" to avoid unionization.' 9 1 These instruments are a "collective
agreement reached at an enterprise between 'ghost' unions-simulated
unions devoid of actual worker representation-and an employer, with
no reference to the workers they cover ... [and where] the workers have
no knowledge of being represented by any union."' 192 Currently, OTLA
is reviewing a submission from the SME and on behalf of over ninety
organizations and labor unions in Mexico.' 93 The submission was submit-
ted after Luz y Fuerza del Centro, a state-owned electricity enterprise,
was seized by the government and 44,000 public employees were ejected
from the workplace by the military police.1 94 According to the submis-
sion, the Mexican government unlawfully expelled thousands of state em-
ployees with the help of 27,000 police and military.' 95 The allegations
include violations of the freedom of association and protection of the
right to organize; the right to bargain collectively, the right to strike; and
prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses.' 9 6 In January 2012,
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id., at 11. Fourteen of these submissions were filed against Mexico, seven against
the United States, and two against Canada. Id.
187. Submissions Under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC), U.S. DIFPARTMI'NT LAn., http://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/
naalc.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
188. See id.
189. See Boi-i-i, supra note 90, at 11.
190. Id.
191. Current FTAs and Labor Rights, GALLOWAY FAM. FOUND., http:/lwww.gal-
lowayfoundation.org/category-current-ftas-and-labor-rights/ (last visited Jan. 14,
2015).
192. Id.
193. See Puni-iC COMMUNICATION TO THE U.S. 011ICE OF TRADE AGREEMENT IMIPLE-
MENTATION (OTLA), supra note 2, at i-iii.
194. Union Workers for Mexico's LyFC Electric Company Dismantled, Voxxi (Jul. 21,
2012), http://voxxi.com/2012/07/21/union-workers-for-mexicos-lyfc-electric-com
pany-dismantled/.
195. PUBIC COMMUNICATION TO THlE U.S. OFFICE OF TRAI)E AGREEMENT IMPILMEN-
TATION (OTLA), supra note 2, at 1.
196. Id. at 2.
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OTLA accepted the submission for review and published notice of re-
ceipt along with a request for extension to review in the Federal Regis-
ter.197 Canada and the United States have also had their share of
complaints filed against them.198
As bad as it might sound, the NAALC has been largely successful. The
NAALC "has encouraged Mexico to begin enforcing its own labor law
permitting workers the right to organize and bargain collectively."' 99
Additionally, it has allowed the communication between these countries
to study and compare labor-related issues and laws. 200 This has enabled
the understanding of labor standards and allowed the flow of quantifiable
data related to labor standards, especially in Mexico. 201 But this optimis-
tic result has not been constant across the board.
B. THE BAD?: JORDAN
1. What Enforcement?!
When it comes to enforcement, the Jordan FTA states that each coun-
try "retains the right to exercise discretion with respect to investigatory,
prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters. ' 20 2 Consequently, the
only method of enforcement of the labor provisions included in article 6
is through the Joint Committee, which is established in article 15 of the
agreement.20 3 The Joint Committee is a group of trade representatives
from each country who are responsible for reviewing, recommending, and
releasing reports regarding issues or developments with the FTA.20 4 If a
dispute arises between the parties, they are required to engage in consul-
tations before a matter is referred to the Joint Committee. 20 5 The Joint
Committee (or a Settlement Panel) then issues a nonbinding decision on
the parties.20 6 Another limitation to enforcement is that, under article 18
of the agreement, the parties promise not to allow a right of action under
their domestic laws and jurisdiction against the other country for viola-
tions of the agreement.20 7 Technically, the Jordan FTA falls within the
oversight of OTLA.20 8 A caveat, however, is that the Jordan FTA does
197. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation: Notice of Extension of the Pe-
riod of Review of Submission, 77 FED. REG. 39265, 39265 (2012), available at http:/
regulations.justia.com/regulations/fedreg/2012/07/02/2012-16140.html.
198. Two submissions are currently under review against Canada, and one against the
United States. Additionally, there are two submissions that resulted in reports
issued against Canada, and ten against the United States. See Submissions under
the NAALC, supra note 187.
199. BOLLE, supra note 90, at 11.
200. Id.
201. See id.
202. Jordan FTA, supra note 62, at art. 5(3)(b).
203. Id. art. 6(5).
204. Id. art. 15(2), (3).
205. Id. art. 17(1)(b).
206. Id. art. 17(1)(d).
207. Id. art. 18(1).
208. The Jordan FFA is specifically listed as one of the FTAs with labor provisions in
the OLTA website. Free Trade Agreement Administration, supra note 175.
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not establish a process for receiving complaints from "interested par-
ties."' 20 9 Therefore, it can be argued that if a submission is submitted to
OTLA's review, a report resulting from it is nonbinding.
2. Noncompliance: What Is Being Done about It?
In Jordan, the government struggles with the enforcement of its labour
law.2 10 Violations go without prosecution and child labor is rampant. 2 11
In 2008, eight years after the signing of the Jordan FTA, the International
Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) released a blistering report on the
state of labor standards and labor rights in Jordan.2 1 2 The report indi-
cates that despite the fact that Jordan ratified "seven of the eight core
ILO labour Conventions," its labor law fails to enforce such commit-
ments.213 One of the key violations is its failure to allow workers to en-
force their right to organize as unions.2 1 4 Although the law in Jordan
technically allows for workers to join unions, workers are constrained and
discouraged from doing so. 2 15 According to the report, "trade unions are
required to be members of the [General Federation of Jordanian Trade
Unions] GFJTU, which is the only trade union federation" and under the
control of the government.2 16 This violation of the ILO right to organize
would also mean that Jordan is in noncompliance with the Jordan IFTA,
which requires Jordan to take affirmative action in the implementation
and promotion of the ILO labor standards, 21 7 including the right of asso-
ciation and the right to organize and bargain collectively. These two stan-
dards are specifically listed in the agreement with the United States.2 18
In addition to violations of the ILO right of association, the ITCU also
found that Jordan is in violation of the ILO protection against discrimina-
tion, which Jordan also adopted.21 9 This ILO standard was not included
in the Jordan FI'A.220 In contrast, protections against child labor and the
prohibition on forced or compulsory labor are part of the Jordan FTA.221
The Jordan labor law prohibits employment of children under sixteen. 222
The ITCU found that "more than 290,000" children in Jordan are work-
209. Id.
210. HASSANIEN, supra note 106, at 200.
211. See id.
212. INTERNATIONAiLY RECOGNISED CORE LABOUR STANDARDS IN JORDAN (2008),
available at http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/Jordan-final-report-2008.pdf.
213. Id. at 1.
214. Id. at 3.
215. Id.
216. The report also indicates that the Jordanian Labor Code "does not ensure protec-
tion against anti-union discrimination" and that only three percent of Jordanian
workers are protected by collected bargaining agreements. Id.
217. Jordan FFA, supra note 62, art. 6(3).
218. Id. art, 6(6).
219. INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED CORE LABOUR STANDARDS IN JORDAN, supra
note 212, at 6.
220. Jordan FTA, supra note 62, at art. 6.
221. Id.
222. INTERNATIONAI Y RECOGNISED CORE LABOUR STANI)ARI)S IN JORDAN, supra
note 212, at 9.
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ing children, 223 despite the fact that Jordan adopted the Minimum Age
Convention from the ILO in 1998.224 Moreover, the ILO in 2008 found
that "Jordan still faces serious challenges to control and eliminate forced
labour and trafficking in and through the country. '225 The U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor has also made findings that challenge the ability of Jordan
to enforce its labor laws, and comply with the Jordan FTA provisions. 226
Additionally, the U.S. Department of State holds that Jordan is a destina-
tion for trafficking and forced labor, specifically in the factories in Quali-
fying Industrial Zones (QIZs). 22 7 The ITCU issued a list of conclusions
and recommendations, which, among other things, advises the govern-
ment of Jordan to implement enforcement mechanisms to better monitor
its labor standards and to make amendments to its current labor code to
bring it into compliance with ILO standards. 228 The Jordan FTA also
requires the parties to take proactive action and amend their labor laws
to comply with the ILO labor standards adopted in the FTA.229 Further-
more, in 2009, U.S. members of the Joint Committee, which included U.S.
Trade Representatives and Department of State and Labor officials, vis-
ited Jordan and factories in QIZs to "monitor working conditions and
urge the government of Jordan to continue making improvements on la-
bor rights issues. '230 As a result, the Joint Committee agreed that the
United States and Jordan would fund an ILO Better Work Program to
monitor the conditions of Jordan's factories. 231 Despite the widespread
complaints and violations of labor standards in Jordan, OTLA has not
accepted any submissions for failure to comply with Jordan's obligations
223. Id.
224. Id. at 8.
225. According to the ITCU, "Filipino, Sri Lankan Bangladeshi and Indonesian women
migrate to work as domestic workers but upon arrival are subject to forced condi-
tions of work, passports are withhold, restrictions on movement, abusive working
conditions, non-payment of wages, threats and physical or sexual abuse." Id. at 10.
226. The DOL found that working children are subject to physical and sexual abuse,
and exposed to dangerous working conditions. Jordan, DOL http://www.dol.gov/
ilab/reports/child-labor/findings/tda2004/jordan.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
227. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: JORDAN, (2009), available at
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2OO8/nea/119118.htm.
228. INTERNATIONALLY RFCOGNISED CORE LABOUR STANDARDS IN JORDAN, supra
note 212, at 12.
229. Jordan FTA, supra note 62, art. 6(1).
230. Jordan Free Trade Agreement, OFrICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/jordan-fta (last vis-
ited Jan. 14, 2015).
231. The oversight is limited to factories in the garment section. Id. The ILO Better
Work Program's last report from December 2013 indicates a mix result in the ef-
forts to address the noncompliance of labor standards in garment factories. Specif-
ically, the report found that there has been improvement in areas such as child
labor issues, where it is non-existent in the garment industry, but revealed major
concerns in issues such as the Freedom of Association, Forced Labor, and Com-
pensation. See ILO, BETTER WORK JORDAN: GARMENT INDUSTRY 5-I COMPLI-
ANCE SYNT-ESIs REPORT 6 (2013), available at http://betterwork.org/jordan/wp-
content/uploads/5th-CSR-FINAL.pdf.
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under the Jordan F-IA.232 Although the violations under the Jordan FTA
might sound appalling, they are certainly not the worst.
C. THE UGLY?: DR-CAFTA
The United States has entered into thirteen FTAs with twenty coun-
tries.2 33 Of these agreements, the DR-CAFTA is likely the most conten-
tious and infamous FTA due to its problematic road to enactment and the
large number of complaints since its passing. This agreement almost did
not pass Congress because of the United States' concerns about the labor
conditions in other countries.2 34 Additionally, OTLA submissions have
been filed against three of the five countries that signed the agreement
with the United States. 235 To fully grasp the bleak fallout and complexity
of the challenges under the DR-CAFrA's labor provisions, one must first
analyze each country's obligations and enforcement mechanisms under
the agreement.
1. Enforcement and Obligations
Article 16 of the DR-CAFIA 236 lists ten obligations related to labor
standards.237 According to these obligations, each party:
1. Shall not fail to effectively enforce its own labor laws in a manner
affecting trade;
2. Shall strive to ensure that ILO labor principles and internationally
recognized worker rights are recognized and protected by domestic
law;
3. Shall strive to ensure it does not to "waive or derogate from" do-
mestic labor law in order to encourage trade or investment;
4. Has the right to establish its own domestic labor standards and
adopt or modify its labor laws;
5. Retains the right to exercise discretion in allocating enforcement
resources;
6. May not undertake labor law enforcement in the others'
territories;
7. Shall ensure procedural guarantees for enforcement of the its la-
bor laws;
8. Shall establish a Labor Affairs Council of cabinet-level or
equivalent representatives, and an office in its labor ministry to serve
as a point of contact for carrying out the Council's work;
232. Submissions Under the Labor Provisions of Free Trade Agreements, supra note
176.
233. Bo.LE, supra note 7, at 2.
234. Marianne Hogan, DR-CAFTA Prescribes a Poison Pill: Remedying The Inadequa-
cies of Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement Labor Provi-
sions, 39 SUIFOLK U. L. REV. 511, 511 (2006).
235. Submissions Under the Labor Provisions of Free Trade Agreements, supra note
176.
236. DR-CAFTA, supra note 127, art. 16.
237. MARY JAN Bo-i-E, DR-CAFI'A LAnOR RioGirs ISSUEs 2 (2005), available at
http:/lwww.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgatelcrs/rs22159.pdf.
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9. Shall be guided by a detailed mechanism for cooperative activities
and trade capacity building.
10. May request consultations with another party on any matter
under the labor chapter.238
Article twenty of the agreement establishes the dispute settlement pro-
vision and sanctions for violations.23 9 These sanctions are limited only to
failure to enforce each country's own labor laws and the maximum pen-
alty is fifteen million dollars annually.240 The enforcement and obligation
structure of the DR-CAFTA falls within the Model Three classifica-
tion.241 This means that the members to the agreement are obligated to
"not fail to effectively enforce" their own labor laws.242 Although each
member country has adopted ILO core standards as a guide for their la-
bor laws, complying with their own labor laws has been a significant
challenge.2 4
3
2. The Difference Between Compliance and Complaints
As a condition for the passage of DR-CAFTA, the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative agreed to provide twenty million dollars to ensure compliance
and "improve labor rights practice and enforcement" in the member
countries. 244 The result was a verification system in which each country
agreed to monitor six focus areas related to workers' rights and labor
laws.245 Despite years of commitment to this system, "improved labor
conditions in the DR-CAFTA countries have not materialized and abuses
continue unabated. '246 Furthermore, failure to protect and meet core
238. Id. at 2.
239. Id.
240. Each country has adopted labor laws that are consistent with ILO standards, ex-
cept El Salvador, which has only adopted six out of the eight ILO standards. Id.
241. Id.
242. DR-CAFFA,supra note 127, art. 16.2.
243. BOLLE, supra note 237, at 4.
244. WOLA, supra note 133, at 1.
245. See CAFTA-DR: White Paper and Verification Reports, supra note 129.
246. WOLA, supra note 133, at 12. There has been a significant surge in the number of
assassinations and other violent crimes against labor leaders in the six member
countries of DR-CAFTA. Id. For example, in El Salvador the Secretary of Fi-
nances of the Salvadoran Electrical Workers Union was killed. Id. Similarly, in
Honduras the Secretary of the Confederation of Honduran workers was shot and
killed, and a labor lawyer was murdered while en route to court to represent work-
ers whose rights had been violated by their employers. Id. This increase in vio-
lence is especially pronounced in Guatemala, where six union leaders have been
assassinated since 2007, including: Pedro Zamora, Secretary General of the Port
Workers Union in Quetzal; Marco Tulio Ramfrez Portela, Secretary of Sports and
Culture of the Guatemalan Banana Workers Union; Carlos Enrique Cruz Her-
nandez, member of the Banana Workers Union; Sergio Garcia, member of the
Health Workers Union; and Israel Romera Estacuy, Secretary General of the
Retalhuleu Municipality Workers Union. Id.
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ILO standards such as freedom of association, 247 discrimination, 248 and
child labor 249 have resulted in submissions to OTLA for failure to comply
with the labor provisions under DR-CAFTA. Consequently, OTLA sub-
missions have been made against the Dominican Republic, Guatemala,
and Honduras. 250 In turn, the OTLA has issued reports for the submis-
sions against the Dominican Republic and Guatemala, and is currently
reviewing the submission against Honduras. 251
In the case of Guatemala, which had some of the most serious of com-
plaints,252 the United States and Guatemala entered into a "robust 18-
point Enforcement Plan" to address labor rights issues.253 This plan 254
required Guatemala to address labor the violations within specific time-
lines. 255 Guatemala also agreed to:
strengthen labor inspections, expedite and streamline the process of
sanctioning employers and ordering remediation of labor violations,
increase labor law compliance by exporting companies, improve the
monitoring and enforcement of labor court orders, publish labor law
enforcement information, and establish mechanisms to ensure that
workers are paid what they are owed when factories close. 256
The plan was enacted in April 2013, five years after the OTLA ac-
247. In the Dominican Republic, where freedom of association is protected by law,
thirty members of the TOS Dominicana union were fired after they petitioned the
Secretary of Labor for recognition and proposed a collective bargaining agreement
with Hanesbrand Inc., a textile facility. Id. at 13. In Nicaragua, thirty-five workers
from KB Manufacturing and twenty workers from Atlantic Manufacturing were
dismissed after they tried to form unions. Id. at 14.
248. Female employees throughout the region face sexual harassment and wage dis-
crimination at work. For example, Honduran women that work in fast food res-
taurants are required to show proof that they are not pregnant and take pregnancy
tests every two weeks. Id. at 15. Women in the Dominican Republic face similar
challenges and many refuse to assert their pregnancy testing rights out of fear of
being fired or forced to resign. Id. Sexual violence is also pervasive, and affects
women across the region in multiple industries, from Honduran fast food workers
to Nicaraguan textile mill employees. Id.
249. According to the ILO, 9.9 percent of children between the ages of five and four-
teen provide child labor in Central America. Id. at 16.
250. Submissions Under the Labor Provisions of Free Trade Agreements, supra note
176.
251. Id.; see also Reports & Submissions, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LAB., http://www.dol
.gov/ilab/reports/search/?q=submission (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
252. The petition was submitted by seven different worker's unions and the complaints
ranged from violations of freedom of association and discrimination, to assassina-
tion and violent crimes against union leaders. See SUBMISSION FiROM AFL-CIO,
supra note 2, at 1-3.
253. Guatemala Submission under CAFTA-DR, U.S. DEPARTMENr Ocw LAB., http://
www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/guatemalasub.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
254. Mutually Agreed Enforcement Action Plan between the Government of the United
States and the Government of Guatemala, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LAB., 1, http://dol
.gov/ilab/reportspdf/0413GuatEnforcementPlan.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
255. See id.
256. Guatemala Submission under CAFTA-DR, supra note 253; see also Fact Sheet:
Guatemala Agrees to Comprehensive Labor Enforcement Plan, Oil. OF TrF U.S.
TRADiE RiPRFSENTArIVL (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-of
fice/fact-sheets/2013/april/guatemala-labor-enforcement.
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cepted the AFL-CIO's submission. 257 Recently, trade representatives
from both countries met in March 2014 to discuss the plan's implementa-
tion.258 According to the U.S. Trade Representative, "further action is
urgently needed to implement the enforcement plan," and if the concerns
are not resolved the "United States reserves the right to restart the dis-
pute settlement proceedings that were suspended as a result of the en-
forcement plan."'25 9 According to the officials, the deadline for
Guatemala to fully comply with the plan is April 25, 2014.260
The OTLA made public a report in response to the submission by Fa-
ther Christopher Hartley.26 1 Father Hartley's submission was actually a
compilation of complaints made by other organizations, families, and un-
ions, and includes allegations of human trafficking, forced labor, child la-
bor, unsanitary living conditions, hazardous working conditions, and
retaliation against workers for their affiliations with organized labor.
262
After an investigation by the OTLA, the U.S. Department of Labor
found evidence of violations of labor law, specifically in the sugar cane
industry, related to "minimum wages, hours of work, occupational safety
and health," child labor, and violations against the freedom of associa-
tion.263 The OTLA made eleven recommendations in the report to ad-
dress the violations and improve labor conditions. 264 Also, "the
Department of Labor announced a [ten million dollar] project to reduce
child labor and to improve labor rights and working conditions in the
Dominican agriculture sector. '265
Similarly, the OTLA accepted a submission from the AFL-CIO and
twenty-six Honduran federations and trade unions alleging that the gov-
ernment of Honduras failed to protect the rights of workers under Hon-
duran law. 266 The OTLA requested an extension to issue a report and is
257. Guatemala Submission under CAFTA-DR, supra note 253.
258. Press Release, Embassy of the United States, Brussels, Belgium, Guatemala, U.S.





261. Letter from Father Christopher Hartley to Gregory Schoepfle, Director of Office
of Trade and Labor Affairs (OTLA), (Dec. 11, 2011), available at http://www.dol
.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/DRsubmission20 1.pdf.
262. Id.
263. Dominican Republic Submission under CAFTA-DR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LAB.,
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/dominicanrepsub.htm (last visited Jan.
15, 2015).
264. Id.
265. Press Release, United States Department of Labor, US Labor Department issues
report on labor concerns in Dominican Republic sugar sector, announces $10 mil-
lion project in agriculture (Sept. 27, 2013), available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/me
dia/press/ilab/ILAB20131979.htm.
266. AM. FED'N OF LABOR AN1) CONG. OF INDUS. ORGS. (AFL-CIO) ET AL., PUnL-IC
SU13MISSION TO I1- IE OFFICE OF TRADE & LABOR AFFAIRS (OTLA) UNDER C1 lAP-
TERS 16 (LABOR) AND 20 (DisPuTE SE 1-TLEMENI) oF rHE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-
CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (DR-CAFTA), U.S. DEP'T OF LA-
BOR (2012), available at http://dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/0413GuatEnforcementPlan
.pdf.
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currently reviewing the allegations.267
The DR-CAFTA is a large trade agreement that highlights the trajec-
tory of the U.S. Government towards conditional inclusion of labor rights
provisions in FTAs. This contentious agreement has led to the exposure
of egregious labor violations in Central America. The outcome of these
complaints under review by the OTLA is crucial to understand the effec-
tiveness of including labor protections in FTAs. But we must remember
that the DR-CAFT'A was enacted almost fourteen years ago, and, until
today, the governments of the countries accused of labor rights violations
have not addressed the complaints.
IV. CONCLUSION
The predominance of labor provisions in FTAs is a polarizing develop-
ment in international trade law that is derived, in part, from the mixed
socioeconomic effects of trade liberalization on developing countries. Al-
though conditional inclusion of these labor protections in FTAs was ar-
guably a response to the negative effects of international trade
liberalization, developing countries still struggle to meet their obligations
under the FTAs. For example, the landmark and most popular of these
FTAs, like the NAALC and DR-CAFTA, have not made a significant
improvement in the labor conditions of their member countries. 268 The
failure to meet the standards and obligations as mandated by the FTAs'
labor rights provisions can be attributed to the complexity of the agree-
ments themselves. In addition, the different models and mix/tier enforce-
ment mechanisms have resulted in a patchwork of instruments that, in
some cases, fail to address the specific nature of each country as a party
to the agreements.2 69 These enforcement mechanisms have low impact
retributory penalties for labor rights violations. Moreover, the evident
apathy270 of the WTO towards labor rights in the international trade
arena leaves the ILO as the sole keeper of international labor rights. But
the ILO's lack of jurisdiction to enforce labor rights has forced the
United States to take on the role of advocate and enforcer of labor rights
in the international setting, at least in FTAs to which the United States is
a party. Nevertheless, the surge of labor rights protections in FTAs has
only become prevalent in the last twenty-five years. Therefore, the real
effect of these provisions on the labor conditions in developing countries
remains to be seen. Hopefully, the results turn out to be more than wish-
ful thinking.
267. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement; Notice
of Extension of the Period of Review for Submission #2012-01 (Honduras), 77 FED.
REG. 66,870 (Nov. 2, 2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-11-
07/pdf/2012-27255.pdf.
268. See supra pp. 135-36.
269. See supra note 177.
270. See supra p. 106.
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